Which document called for a broad, sustained buildup of conventional and nuclear forces to counter the Soviet threat?

Which document called for a broad, sustained buildup of conventional and nuclear forces to counter the Soviet threat?

• A. The Marshall Plan
• B. NSC-68
• C. The Truman Doctrine
• D. The Potsdam Declaration

Answer: (B)

A strategic response to the Soviet threat in the early Cold War era required a sustained, comprehensive buildup of military power across both conventional forces and nuclear capabilities. NSC-68 argued that the United States could not rely on limited force or diplomacy alone; to deter Soviet aggression and secure the Western alliance, the U.S. needed a long-term, broad expansion of its armed forces, modernization of conventional military capacity, and a significantly strengthened nuclear arsenal, backed by allied commitments and the economic resources to sustain it. This document framed deterrence as something tangible and durable—credible force ready to respond to aggression—rather than a posture based on promises or economic aid alone. In contrast, the Truman Doctrine focused on preventing communist expansion through aid and political support to threatened nations; the Marshall Plan aimed at rebuilding Western Europe through economic assistance; and the Potsdam Declaration outlined terms for Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II. None of those advocate the large-scale, sustained military buildup envisioned in NSC-68.

A strategic response to the Soviet threat in the early Cold War era required a sustained, comprehensive buildup of military power across both conventional forces and nuclear capabilities. NSC-68 argued that the United States could not rely on limited force or diplomacy alone; to deter Soviet aggression and secure the Western alliance, the U.S. needed a long-term, broad expansion of its armed forces, modernization of conventional military capacity, and a significantly strengthened nuclear arsenal, backed by allied commitments and the economic resources to sustain it. This document framed deterrence as something tangible and durable—credible force ready to respond to aggression—rather than a posture based on promises or economic aid alone.

In contrast, the Truman Doctrine focused on preventing communist expansion through aid and political support to threatened nations; the Marshall Plan aimed at rebuilding Western Europe through economic assistance; and the Potsdam Declaration outlined terms for Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II. None of those advocate the large-scale, sustained military buildup envisioned in NSC-68.